首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     检索      

供应链构建的博弈分析
引用本文:林旭东,朱顺泉.供应链构建的博弈分析[J].价值工程,2004,23(4):46-49.
作者姓名:林旭东  朱顺泉
作者单位:1. 深圳大学管理学院,深圳,518060
2. 暨南大学管理学院,广州,510632
摘    要:文章在供应链吸纳新成员的博弈分析中,建立了一个支付博弈矩阵,根据纳什均衡的必要条件,确定了目标企业的范围,并从中选择最优企业。在供应链整合期,应用负激励模型约束成员企业的违约行为,同时指出,供应链企业在重复博弈中,运用可信承诺、触发策略可限制企业的机会主义行为,从而供应链企业可以形成长期的合作关系。

关 键 词:目标企业  择优决策  供应链整合

Game analyses on the establishment of supply chain
Lin Xudong, Zhu Shunquan.Game analyses on the establishment of supply chain[J].Value Engineering,2004,23(4):46-49.
Authors:Lin Xudong  Zhu Shunquan
Abstract:Game analyses about supply chain′s absorbing new members are studied through setting up a payment game matrix.Based on Nash′s balance essential condition,the objective corporations are concluded ,from which the optimum one is selected. During the supply chain integration, the default behavior of member corporations can be restricted by using negative encourage model.And in the same time supply chain corporation can confine opportunism behavior by using credit commitment and trigger strategy.Thus these supply chain corporations can form a better cooperation alliance.
Keywords:objective corporation  preferred decision  supply chain integration  
本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号