业绩承诺：保护措施还是套利工具？——来自高管减持的经验证据

近年来，并购重组过程中业绩承诺未达标现象频发，引起了理论界和实务界的普遍关注。文章以2008-2017年A股上市公司并购事件为样本，探究了业绩承诺与高管减持间的关系。研究发现：相比于未签订业绩承诺协议的上市公司，签订业绩承诺协议的上市公司高管在并购当年更容易发生减持，且减持后上市公司长期市场表现更差，验证了业绩承诺的套利属性；进一步研究发现，这种套利程度在非国有企业更明显，而高质量的内部控制、更多的分析师关注和并购问询可以有效的抑制上市公司高管通过签订业绩承诺抬高股价从而减持套利的程度。文章不仅为理解业绩承诺协议的套利动机提供了理论与经验证据，也对完善业绩承诺协议相关制度、预防潜在内幕交易、保护中小投资者权益以及维护资本市场的有效秩序提供了借鉴与参考。

Performance Commitment：Protective Measures or Arbitrage Tools?——Empirical Evidence from Executives’ Shares Selling

In recent years, the phenomenon of substandard performance commitment in the process of M&A is frequent, which has aroused widespread concern in the theoretical and practical circles. Based on the M&A events of A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2017, this paper explores the relationship between performance commitment and executives' shares selling. The results indicate that compared with the listed companies without performance commitment, executives of listed companies with performance commitment are more likely to sell their shares in the year of M&A. Also, the long-term market performance of the listed companies with performance commitment is worse after the executives' shares selling, which verifies the arbitrage view of performance commitments. Further analysis shows that this arbitrage degree is more obvious in non-state-owned enterprises, and high-quality internal control, more analyst attention, and more M&A inquiries can effectively inhibit the executives' shares selling for arbitrage in M&As with performance commitment. This study not only provides theoretical and empirical evidence for understanding the arbitrage motivation of performance commitment agreement, but also provides reference for improving the relevant system of performance commitment in M&As, preventing potential insider trading, protecting the rights and interests of small and medium-sized investors and maintaining the effective order of capital market.