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个体认知、权威决策与中国农地制度变迁——一个动态演化博弈模型的构建及检验
引用本文:丰 雷 张明辉 韩 松 江 丽. 个体认知、权威决策与中国农地制度变迁——一个动态演化博弈模型的构建及检验[J]. 政治经济学评论, 2020, 11(2): 156-180
作者姓名:丰 雷 张明辉 韩 松 江 丽
作者单位:中国人民大学公共管理学院;中国人民大学经济学院
基金项目:教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目“改革开放以来的中国农村土地制度变迁:中央—地方—农户三者互动关系研究”(编号:16YJA630009);中国人民大学2020年度“中央高校建设世界一流大学(学科)和特色发展引导专项资金”的研究成果。
摘    要:超越"强制性-诱致性变迁"二分法,构建动态制度变迁模型是制度经济学研究的前沿和难题。本文初步构建了一个以个体和权威为主体,包含制度变迁成本的动态演化博弈模型,并以中国农地制度变迁历程中的两个典型案例进行实证检验。研究表明,权威决策是正式规则的主要来源,个体共同认知则是非正式约束的主要来源,二者共同决定了制度变迁的方向;制度变迁成本是重要的激励约束因素,制度变迁的速度则取决于制度变迁成本与个体认知、权威决策三者的一致性程度,一个高效、有序的制度变迁过程应尽量避免三者的背离和冲突。因此,政府主导进行的农地制度改革应特别关注农民认知,尊重农民意愿;对具有高变迁成本的制度变迁采取渐进改革的方式,适时建立过渡性的制度安排,并在改革的速度与质量之间做好权衡,以减少改革阻力,提高改革效率。

关 键 词:个体认知  权威决策  制度变迁成本  农地制度  演化博弈

Individual Cognition,Authority Decision and Land Institutional Change in Rural China: The Construction and Test of a Dynamic Evolutionary Game Model
Feng Lei,Zhang Minghui,Han Song,Jiang Li. Individual Cognition,Authority Decision and Land Institutional Change in Rural China: The Construction and Test of a Dynamic Evolutionary Game Model[J]. China Review of Political Economy, 2020, 11(2): 156-180
Authors:Feng Lei  Zhang Minghui  Han Song  Jiang Li
Abstract:The construction of dynamic institutional change model beyond the dichotomy of"imposed-induced institutional change",is the frontier and difficulty of institutional economics.In this paper,a dynamic evolutionary game model is developed,in which individual and authority are the players of the game and the cost of institutional change is the influencing factor.Based on this model,two typical cases of land institutional change in rural China are empirically tested.The results are as follows.Firstly,authority decision is the main source of formal institutions,and individual co-cognition is manifested as informal constraints,which jointly determine the direction of institutional change.Secondly,for institutional change,the cost of institutional change is an important incentive and constraint factor.And the speed of institutional change depends on the degree of consistency among individual cognition,authority decision and the cost of institutional change.The deviation and conflict among the three should be avoided as much as possible,to ensure an efficient and ordered process of institutional change.Therefore,rural land reform led by the government should pay special attention to farmers’cognition,respect farmers’wills,adopt gradual reform in high-cost institutional changes,establish transitional institutional arrangements in due time,and balance the speed and quality of reform to reduce the resistance and improve the efficiency.
Keywords:individual cognition  authority decision  cost of institutional change  rural land institutions  evolutionary game theory
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