The Potential for Cross‐Compliance in Canadian Agricultural Policy: Linking Environmental Goals with Business Risk Management Programs

Environmental cross‐compliance links agricultural program payments to producer commitments to achieve agri‐environmental policy goals. The objective of this study is to determine the feasibility of using cross‐compliance to achieve environmental goals in a Canadian policy context. While Canadian policy makers have flirted with cross‐compliance, with the exception of phosphorus regulations for Quebec hog farms, they have never adopted this approach. The potential for effective cross‐compliance depends on producer participation, producer compliance with regulations, environmental performance, and overall welfare implications. This study reviews the application of cross‐compliance in the United States and EU with regard to the potential application to Canadian agriculture. Policy options are considered which link current business risk management (BRM) programs to alternative environmental regulations (wildlife habitat preservation, nutrient management plans, and beneficial management practices for nutrient management). In general, individual Canadian agricultural support program do not provide sufficient incentives for farmers to participate in cross‐compliance. However, if support programs are combined, it is better to link programs that redistribute income with environmental programs than to link agriculture programs that already address specific market failures.