Quasitransitive social preference: why some very large coalitions have very little power |
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| Authors: | Donald E. Campbell Jerry S. Kelly |
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| Affiliation: | (1) Department of Economics and The Program in Public Policy, The College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, VA 23187-8795, USA, US;(2) Department of Economics, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY 13244-1090, USA, US |
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| Abstract: | Summary. If only the strict part of social preference is required to be transitive then Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives implies that there is a coalition containing all but one individual that cannot force x to be socially ranked above y for at least half of the pairs of alternatives (x,y). Received: August 29, 1996; revised version: March 24, 1997 |
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| Keywords: | JEL Classification Numbers: D61 D71. |
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