Retrading in market games |
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Authors: | Sayantan Ghosal Massimo Morelli |
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Institution: | a Department of Economics, University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK b Department of Economics, Ohio State University, OH, USA |
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Abstract: | When agents are not price takers, they typically cannot obtain an efficient real location of resources in one round of trade. This paper presents a non-cooperative model of imperfect competition where agents can retrade allocations, consistent with Edgeworth's idea of recontracting. We show (a) there are Pareto optimal allocations, including competitive equilibrium allocations, that can be approximated arbitrarily closely when trade is myopic, i.e., when agents play a static Nash equilibrium at every round of retrading; (b) any converging sequence of allocations generated by myopic retrading can be supported along some retrade-proof subgame perfect equilibrium path when traders anticipate future rounds of trading. |
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Keywords: | Market games Retrading Myopic versus far-sighted behavior Retrade-proofness |
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