How (not) to run auctions: The European 3G telecom auctions |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Physics Department, Theory Unit, CERN, CH-1211 Genève 23, Switzerland;2. Dep. de Fisica de Particulas, U. de Santiago de Compostela, E-15782 Santiago de Compostela, Galicia, Spain;3. Dipartimento di Fisica e Astronomia, Università di Firenze, Via G. Sansone 1, I-50019 Sesto F.no (Firenze), Italy;4. INFN - Sezione di Firenze, Via G. Sansone 1, I-50019 Sesto F.no (Firenze), Italy;5. INAF - Osservatorio Astrofisico di Arcetri, L.go E. Fermi 5, I-50125 Firenze, Italy;6. INFN - Sezione di Ferrara, Via Saragat 1, I-44100 Ferrara, Italy;7. Dipartimento di Fisica e Scienze della Terra, Università di Ferrara, Via Saragat 1, I-44100 Ferrara, Italy;1. Fraunhofer Institute for System and Innovations Research (Fraunhofer ISI), Breslauer Strasse 48, 76139 Karlsruhe, Germany;2. Energy Economics Group (EEG), Institute of Energy Systems and Electric Drives TU Wien, Gusshausstrasse 25-29/370-3, A-1040 Vienna, Austria;3. Institute for Industrial Production (IIP), Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Hertzstr. 16, 76187 Karlsruhe, Germany |
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| Abstract: | ![]()
There were enormous differences in the revenues from the European “third generation” (3G, or “UMTS”) mobile-phone license auctions, from 20 Euros per capita in Switzerland to 650 Euros per capita in the UK, though the values of the licenses sold were similar. Poor auction designs in some countries facilitated collusion between firms and failed to attract entrants. The sequencing of the auctions was also crucial. We discuss the auctions in the UK, Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Austria, Switzerland, Belgium, Greece and Denmark. |
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