| 基于利益博弈的闲置土地处置研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 罗伟玲,刘禹麒.基于利益博弈的闲置土地处置研究[J].广东土地科学,2010,9(3):41-44. |
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| 作者姓名： | 罗伟玲 刘禹麒 |
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| 作者单位： | [1]广东卓越土地房地产评估咨询有限公司,广东广州510075 [2]广东省土地调查规划院,广东广州510075 |
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| 基金项目： | “十一五”国家科技支撑计划重大项目“村镇空间规划与土地利用关键技术研究”之课题10“珠三角村镇土地优化开发技术研究”(206BAJ95A10) |
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| 摘 要： | 近年来，国家出台了大量闲置土地处置的政策，然而其实施及执行效果并不理想。究其根源，受当前财税体制以及绩效目标的影响．地方政府执行国家政策的忠诚度往往让位于土地、房地产开发引致的各项财税收入的增加，因而与闲置土地占有者形成了利益同盟。由此暴露出当前制度缺陷是闲置土地处置权限不科学、处置细则不明确，建议上移闲置土地处置权主体，建立合理的利益促进机制，明确具体实施细则并强化相关的政策要求来完善当前的闲置土地处置政策。
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| 关 键 词： | 闲置土地 利益博弈 处置 缺陷 建议 |
Research on the Idle Land Disposal from the Perspective of Interest Game |
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| Authors: | LUO wei-ling |
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| Institution: | LUO wei-ling(1.Guangdong Excellence Real Estate Appraisal & Consulting Co.,LTD,Guangzhou 510075,China,2.Guangdong Provincial Institute of Land Surveying and Planning,China) |
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| Abstract: | In recent years,the state introduced a lot of policy of idle land disposal,but the effectiveness of its implementation and enforcement is not ideal.Exploring its root causes,in the process of handling idle land the loyalty of executing national policy gives way to the the increase of tax revenue by the real estate development affected by the current tax system and performance goals,therefore the local government and the landholders formed the alliance.Thus it is exposed the flaws that idle land disposal rig... |
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| Keywords: | Idle land benefit game handle defect suggestion |
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