| 国有企业激励与约束的均衡机制探索 |
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| 引用本文： | 邹照菊.国有企业激励与约束的均衡机制探索[J].财会通讯,2005(5). |
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| 作者姓名： | 邹照菊 |
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| 作者单位： | 湖北经济学院会计学院 湖北武汉430079 |
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| 摘 要： | 合理的激励约束机1制能有效降低国有企业中的委托代理成本和风险,但目前对我国国有企中经营者的激励和约束存在着激励不足、激励过度、约束不足和约束过度等不对等、不均衡问题。本文分析了激励约束不对等的现状及原因,并提出了构建动态均衡的激励约束机制的对策建议。
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| 关 键 词： | 委托代理 激励约束 动态均衡 |
An Exploration on Equilibrium of Stimulation-control System in State-owned Enterprises |
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| Zou Zhaoju.An Exploration on Equilibrium of Stimulation-control System in State-owned Enterprises[J].Communication of Finance and Accounting,2005(5). |
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| Authors: | Zou Zhaoju |
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| Abstract: | Rational stimulation-control system can effectively reduce client-agent cost and risk. But problems such as below- or over-stimulation, and below- or over-control are still existing in the present stimulation-control system about operators in SOEs. This paper analyses the situations and reasons, then it provides some advices to construct a dynamically balanceable stimulation-control system. |
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| Keywords: | Client-agent Stimulation-control system Dynamic equilibrium |
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