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农村民间金融契约治理机制探析
引用本文:张晓艳,刘明.农村民间金融契约治理机制探析[J].经济问题,2009(7).
作者姓名:张晓艳  刘明
作者单位:西安理工大学经济系;陕西师范大学农村发展研究中心;
基金项目:国家社科基金资助课题“完善农村金融体系和强化农村金融服务研究”的阶段性研究成果(07BJY169)
摘    要:对农村民间金融不完备借贷契约下的高履约率现象进行了分析。认为农村民间金融保持高履约率的"秘密"在于其高效的私人治理机制,这些机制主要包括信息与信任机制、重复博弈与声誉机制、灵活的抵押担保机制和多样的惩罚机制等。得出的结论是:农村民间金融具有自动履约的内在机制,当前应赋予农村民间金融合法的生存地位,并通过相关法律的完善促进其规范发展。

关 键 词:农村民间金融  契约治理  信任机制  声誉机制  

Study on Fulfillment Mechanism of Informal Finance in Rural Area
ZHANG Xiao-yan,LIU Ming.Study on Fulfillment Mechanism of Informal Finance in Rural Area[J].On Economic Problems,2009(7).
Authors:ZHANG Xiao-yan  LIU Ming
Institution:1.Department of Economics;Xi'an University of Technology;Xi'an 710054;China;2.Research Center of Rural Economic Development;Normal University;Xi'an 710061;China
Abstract:This paper studied the phenomenon of high-performance rates under incomplete contract of informal finance in rural area.It considers the "secret" lies in its high efficiency of private fulfillment mechanisms.These mechanisms include information and trust mechanism,repeating game and reputation mechanism,flexible collateral mechanism and variety of punitive mechanism etc.The conclusion is that the informal finance in rural area has its automatic fulfillment inherent mechanism,it should be given legal status ...
Keywords:informal finance in rural area  contract fulfillment  trust mechanism  reputation mechanism  
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