| 污染物排放治理问题的双方与三方博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 郭娟,董许亮.污染物排放治理问题的双方与三方博弈分析[J].科技和产业,2010,10(7):15-17. |
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| 作者姓名： | 郭娟 董许亮 |
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| 作者单位： | 湘潭大学,商学院,湖南,湘潭,411105 |
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| 摘 要： | 针对环境污染治理过程中存在的信息不对称性,分别建立了政府与排污企业、排污企业与受害者的双方博弈模型,在此基础上建立三方参与的不完全信息动态博弈模型分析污染物治理,借助博弈树分析各个博弈参与方的策略与收益,并根据博弈结果设计合理的治理机制和解决措施。
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| 关 键 词： | 污染物排放 博弈分析 三方博弈 集体困境 |
Gambling Analysis of Contamination Emission Prevention Based on Two-party and Three-party Model |
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| GUO Juan,DONG Xu-liang.Gambling Analysis of Contamination Emission Prevention Based on Two-party and Three-party Model[J].SCIENCE TECHNOLOGY AND INDUSTRIAL,2010,10(7):15-17. |
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| Authors: | GUO Juan DONG Xu-liang |
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| Abstract: | This research has built two-party game models of government versus corporation and corporation versus individual based on information asymmetry of environment pollution prevention. Then use game tree to build a dynamic three-party game model of incomplete information to analyze the process of pollution prevention, and design reasonable mechanisms and measures to solve the problem. |
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| Keywords: | contamination emission game theory third-party play collective dilemma |
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