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| 存款保险制度能否降低银行系统风险 | |
| 引用本文： | 李鹏,蔡庆丰. 存款保险制度能否降低银行系统风险[J]. 商业研究, 2005, 0(4): 27-30 |
| 作者姓名： | 李鹏 蔡庆丰 |
| 作者单位： | 厦门大学,经济学院,福建,厦门,361005 |
| 摘 要： | 存款保险制度能否通过对可能的存款损失提供保险来降低银行风险,维护金融系统的稳定?或者会对银行道德风险行为形成逆向激励,加大了破产的可能性?目前有一种简单的模型对存款保险与银行系统风险关系及其影响因素能进行分析,并以此得出相应的结论与建议。 |
| 关 键 词： | 存款保险 银行系统风险 风险补偿 |
| 文章编号： | 1001-148(2005)04-0027-03 |
| 修稿时间： | 2003-11-07 |
On the Probabilities of Deposit Insurance System Lowering Bank System Risks |
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| Abstract: | By protecting depositor from the loss in the event of bank default, can deposit insurance lower bank system risk and enhance the stability of financial system? Or will it create moral hazardous incentives that increase the prabability of bankrupcy? This paper develops a simple model to analyze the relationship between deposit insurance and the risk of bank system, and their influential factors. It then offers the corresponding our conclusion and advice. |
| Keywords: | deposit insurance bank system risk risk premium |
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