Are we nice(r) to nice(r) people?—An experimental analysis |
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| Authors: | Max Albert Werner Güth Erich Kirchler Boris Maciejovsky |
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| Affiliation: | 1.Saarland University, Economic Theory,Saarbrücken,Germany;2.Max Planck Institute of Economics,Strategic Interaction Group,Jena,Germany;3.University of Vienna, Faculty of Psychology, Economic Psychology,Vienna,Austria;4.Massachusetts Institute of Technology,Sloan School of Management,Cambridge,USA |
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| Abstract: | ![]()
We experimentally investigate whether individuals can reliably detect cooperators (the nice(r) people) in an anonymous decision environment involving “connected games.” Participants can condition their choices in an asymmetric prisoners’ dilemma and a trust game on past individual (their partner’s donation share to a self-selected charity) and social (whether their partner belongs to a group with high or low average donations) information. Thus, the two measures of niceness are the individual donation share in the donation task, and the cooperativeness of one’s choice in the two games. We find that high donors achieve a higher-than-average expected payoff by cooperating predominantly with other high donors. Group affiliation proved to be irrelevant. Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at . JEL Classification C91, C72, D3 |
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| Keywords: | Game theory Conditional cooperation Connected games Donation behavior |
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