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代理人市场—声誉模型在内部经理人市场中的拓展应用
引用本文:闫景园, 黄安仲,.代理人市场—声誉模型在内部经理人市场中的拓展应用[J].华东经济管理,2008,22(1):150-152.
作者姓名:闫景园  黄安仲  
作者单位:安徽工业大学,经济学院,安徽,马鞍山,243002
摘    要:我国外部经理人市场尚不完善,外部经理人市场上的声誉作为经理人显性激励契约的替代作用有限.文章在假设不存在外部经理人市场的前提下,研究了内部经理人市场对经理人产生激励的方式和影响因素,认为内部经理人市场的考核晋升机制和不同职位的隐性收益对经理人的行为有重要影响,提出了优化企业考核晋升机制、降低隐性职位收益、进一步完善外部经理人市场的建议.

关 键 词:声誉模型  内部经理人市场  激励
文章编号:1007-5097(2008)01-0150-03
收稿时间:2007-06-18
修稿时间:2007年6月18日

An Expended Application of Reputation Effects Model in Interior Handlers Market
YANG Jing-yuan; HUANG An-zhong.An Expended Application of Reputation Effects Model in Interior Handlers Market[J].East China Economic Management,2008,22(1):150-152.
Authors:YANG Jing-yuan; HUANG An-zhong
Institution:School of Economics; AHUT; Ma'anshan 243002; China
Abstract:Outer handlers market has been playing a limited role as a substitute for dominant owner incentive contracts for it is still imperfect. Under the assumption that outer handlers market does not exit, this paper researches the effecting factors and ways provided by interior handlers market, and proves that assessment criteria, opportunity for advancement and recessive profits furnished by different position have a great influence on a handler. At last this paper gives some advices including optimizing assessment criteria, bringing down recessive profits and building an effective outer handlers market
Keywords:reputation effects  interior handlers market  incentive
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