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Average Monotonic Cooperative Games
Authors:Josep M. Izquierdo  Carles Rafels
Affiliation:Department of Actuarial, Financial and Economic Mathematics, CREB, University of Barcelona, Avda. Diagonal 690, E-08034, Barcelona, Spain
Abstract:A subclass of monotonic transferable utility (T.U.) games is studied: average monotonic games. These games are totally balanced. We prove that the core coincides with both the bargaining set à la Davis and Maschler and the bargaining set à la Mas-Colell. To obtain this result a technique based on reduced games is used. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C71
Keywords:core   reduced game   bargaining sets
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