高管股权激励 、约束机制与对外直接投资速率

对外直接投资速率是企业国际化过程中面临的重要决策 ,但并未引起学术界的广泛重视.文章从公司治理的视角剖析了企业对外直接投资速率的决策驱动机制,并基于2004-2013年中国上市公司在全球范围内的对外直接投资数据 ,探讨了高管股权激励对于对外直接投资速率的影响以及高管所面临的内外部约束机制对两者关系的调节作用.实证结果显示:(1)股权激励总体上使得高管倾向于选择快速扩张的投资策略;(2)内部约束机制会强化高管股权激励与对外直接投资速率之间的正向关系;(3)外部约束机制会弱化高管股权激励与企业对外直接投资速率之间的正向关系.进一步研究发现:在民营企业内部 ,高管股权激励对于加快企业投资的激励效果以及外部约束机制的调节作用更加明显;而无论是民营企业还是国有企业 ,内部约束机制的调节作用均十分显著.文章为如何充分调动企业高管积极性和主动性去实施"走出去"战略以及抓住国际化机遇提供了借鉴.

Top Executive Stock-based Compensation,Monitoring Mechanisms and FDI Pace

As a critical decision proposition of firm internationalization ,FDI pace has not drawn much academic attention .This paper deep explores certain driving mechanisms of FDI pace decision from a perspective of corporate governance .Then based on FDI data all over the world by Chinese listed companies from 2004 to 2013 ,it examines the impact of top executive stock-based compensation on FDI pace and the adjustment role of internal and external monitoring mechanisms facing topexecutives in this relationship .It arrives at the resultsas follows :firstly ,generally stock-based compensation makes top executives tend to select rapid-expansion investment strategy ;secondly ,internal monitoring mecha-nisms trengthens the positive relationship between top executive stock-based compensation and FDI pace ;thirdly ,external monitoring mechanism weakens the positive relationship between top executive stock-based compensation and FDI pace .Further study demonstrates that for private enterprises ,the effect of top executive stock-based compensation on speed-ing up FDI pace and the adjustment role of external monitoring mechanisms are more significant ;and for both private and state-owned enterprises ,the adjustment role of internal monitoring mechanisms is very significant .This paper gives corresponding policy recom-mendations on how to fully mobilize the enthusiasm and initiative of top executives to im-plement going-out strategy and grasp internationalization opportunities .