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HORIZONTAL MERGERS,STRUCTURAL REMEDIES,AND CONSUMER WELFARE IN A COURNOT OLIGOPOLY WITH ASSETS*
Authors:THIBAUD VERGÉ
Affiliation:CREST (Laboratoire d'économie Industrielle), Timbre J330, 15 Boulevard Gabriel Péri, 92245 Malakoff Cedex, France.
e‐mail:thibaud.verge@ensae.fr
Abstract:Competition authorities sometimes require that firms divest some of their assets to rivals in order to allow a merger to take place. This paper extends the results of Farrell and Shapiro [1990a] and shows that, in the absence of technological synergies, a merger is highly unlikely to benefit consumers, even if it is subjected to appropriate structural remedies. For instance, a merger may ultimately lead to a lower price only if at least two different firms acquire the divested assets, and if the merging parties had relatively important pre‐merger market shares.
Keywords:D43  K21  L13  L41
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