企业终级控股者在什么条件下开始剥夺？

关于剥夺者开始剥夺的条件问题,已有部分中外学者建立了研究模型。根据这些模型提供的线索,本丈将拓展研究其现金流权持有比例对于剥夺的条件问题:通过建立企业终极控股者“在市”条件下的总体利益函数,确定“剥夺临界点”,以此描述终极控股者的行为选择条件,并进而揭示股权分布程度及股票价格振荡的深层原因和政策启示。

On What Condition Will Controlling Shareholders Start expropriating?

Some scholars at home and abroad have researched the condition of expropriators' behavior by models.With those models,this paper studies an issue that proportion of cash flow ownership by controlling shareholders may restrain themselves from expropriating minority of shareholders.In the paper,author defines the concept of the critical point of proportion of cash flow ownership to proportion,and deduces a function about controlling shareholder' s private benefits on stock market,and reveals those reasons of ownership distribution and stock price change.