Debt Relief: Implications of Secondary Market Discounts and Debt Overhangs |
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Authors: | Cohen Daniel |
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Affiliation: | The author is a professor of economics at the University of Nancy and a research fellow at the Centre d'Etudes Prospectives d'Economie Mathématique Appliquées à la Planification, Paris, and at the Centre for Economic Policy Research, London. |
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Abstract: | ![]() An efficient rescheduling of the debt must take into accountthe market value of the debt. I argue here that the appropriateapproach is not to write down the debt to its value on the secondarymarket, but to scale the flows of payments on the debt. Thekey to an efficient rescheduling is to offer debt relief reflectingthe market discount, where the relief is contingent upon thecountry's adjustment effort (rather than setting repayment terms"once and for all" as in the Brady plan). I propose, as an example,that stabilization or adjustment programs under the aegis ofthe International Monetary Fund or the World Bank could includeprovisions allowing debt servicing or repurchase for a set durationat the secondary market rate. This would both reflect and provideincentives to increase a country's ability to repay. |
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