SMEs and public procurement policy |
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Authors: | Email author" target="_blank">Pierre-Henri?MorandEmail author |
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Institution: | (1) CRESE, University of Franche-Comté, 45, avenue de lObservatoire, 25 030 Besançon, France |
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Abstract: | In this paper, we characterize an optimal procurement policy as a mechanism design problem when an allotment of the contract is available, i.e., when a government faces both SMEs and large firms for carrying out a heterogeneously divisible project. Our model allows us to analyze all procurement policies (set-asides, favoritism, non-discriminatory rules), taking into account both efficiency and distributive arguments and derive a normative framework. We show that set-asides are not generally optimal, whatever the industrial preferences of the government are, while the optimal preferential treatments of firms implies complex non-linear rules. We prove that the optimal policy can be implemented using a modified Vickrey-type auction. We also consider that the firms can reduce their cost by a non observable effort, and exhibit the specific impact of cost reduction incentives on the optimal policies.Received: 24 September 2001, JEL Classification:
D44Pierre-HenriMorand : I am grateful to the anonymous referees for comments. The usualdisclaimer applies. |
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Keywords: | Auctions SMEs procurement discrimination moral hazard |
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