The strategic sincerity of Approval voting |
| |
Authors: | Matías Núñez |
| |
Institution: | 1. Université de Cergy-Pontoise, CNRS, THEMA, 95000?, Cergy-Pontoise, France
|
| |
Abstract: | We show that Approval voting need not trigger sincere behavior in equilibrium of Poisson voting games and hence might lead a strategic voter to skip a candidate preferred to his worst preferred approved candidate. We identify two main rationales for these violations of sincerity. First, if a candidate has no votes, a voter might skip him. Notwithstanding, we provide sufficient conditions on the voters’ preference intensities to remove this sort of insincerity. On the contrary, if the candidate gets a positive share of the votes, a voter might skip him solely on the basis of his ordinal preferences. This second type of insincerity is a consequence of the correlation of the candidates’ scores. The incentives for sincerity of rank scoring rules are also discussed. |
| |
Keywords: | |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|