缩小农村集体建设用地隐形交易市场的途径分析——基于利益主体博弈的角度

旨在探讨农村集体建设用地进行私下交易形成隐形交易市场的原因,提出缩小这种隐形交易市场规模的途径。研究结果表明,随着用地企业风险偏好和地下交易超常收益的增加,以及地下交易惩罚和信用损失的降低,用地企业的地下交易空间将会扩大,而随着地方政府的风险偏好、积极监督成本和监督不力收益的增加,以及用地企业地下交易给地方政府造成潜在损失和积极监督收益的减少,地方政府的监督空间将会缩小,用地企业地下交易行为就会扩大。缩小这种隐形交易市场规模的途径就是推行农村集体建设用地自由流转。

Analysis on How to Narrow the Invisible Market of the Rural Collective Construction Land Transaction:In View of Game Analysis on Interest Subject

The purpose of the paper is to explore the reason of the invisible market for the rural collective construction land transaction privately and find the way to narrow the invisible market scale.The results indicate that with the increase of risk preferences of land using enterprises and abnormal returns for underground transaction,and with the decrease of underground transaction penalties and credit losses,underground transaction space of land using enterprises will be expanded,while with the increase of risk preferences of local governments,active supervision costs and returns for oversight,and with the decrease of potential revenue losses by land using enterprises’ underground transaction and a returns for active supervision,local governments’ supervision space will be reduced and underground transaction space of land using enterprises will be expanded.It is concluded that making collective construction land circulate freely can promote the output growth of the whole society,save the social transaction cost and make rural collective organizations receive more land value-added benefits.The way to narrow the invisible market scale is to put the free circulation of the collective construction land in practice.