Do corporations overinvest? Evidence from Tunisia |
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摘 要: | The authors study the positive relationship existing between internal net worth and investment. This relationship has been interpreted in the financial literature as evidence showing that the management overinvests the free cash flow available to them in poorly-performing, sub-optimal investment projects. In this paper, the authors empirically tackle this problem in the case of the manufacturing and industrial Tunisian corporations and show that our empirical regularities do not stand for this interpretation. The authors conversely prove that overinvestment does not seem to occur on the basis of the grouping results. Hereby, there do not corroborate the empirical regularities documented in Lamont (1997).
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关 键 词: | 投资项目 突尼斯 过度 证据 企业 经验规律 净资产 作者 |
Do corporations overinvest? Evidence from Tunisia |
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Authors: | Mongi Lassoued Walid Mansour Mohamed Ben Abdelhamid |
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Institution: | Institut Superieur de Finances et de Fiscalite de Sousse, Sousse 4000, Tunisia |
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Abstract: | overinvestment agency problems Tunisia |
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Keywords: | overinvestment agency problems Tunisia |
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