Multistage public education,voting, and income distribution |
| |
Authors: | Katsuyuki?Naito mailto:k.naito.@gmail.com" title=" k.naito.@gmail.com" itemprop=" email" data-track=" click" data-track-action=" Email author" data-track-label=" " >Email author http://orcid.org/---" itemprop=" url" title=" View OrcID profile" target=" _blank" rel=" noopener" data-track=" click" data-track-action=" OrcID" data-track-label=" " >View author s OrcID profile,Keigo?Nishida |
| |
Affiliation: | 1.Faculty of Economics,Asia University,Tokyo,Japan;2.Faculty of Economics,Fukuoka University,Fukuoka,Japan |
| |
Abstract: | This paper proposes a theory to study the formulation of education policies and human capital accumulation. The government collects income taxes and allocates tax revenue to primary and higher education. The tax rate and the allocation rule are both endogenously determined through majority voting. The tax rate is kept at a low level, and public funding for higher education is not supported unless the majority of individuals have human capital above some threshold. Although public support for higher education promotes aggregate human capital accumulation, it may create long-run income inequality because the poor are excluded from higher education. |
| |
Keywords: | |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|