| Abstract: | Uncertainty is a constant theme when corporations are in financial distress. Yet any successful restructuring of an insolvent corporation requires numerous stakeholders, including creditors, employees and suppliers, repose some degree of trust in those corporate officers who are trying to continue to operate the firm while restructuring it into a viable entity. This article looks at the issue of the positive and negative incentives that can be generated for corporate officers and directors from both their continuing control of corporate assets and their potential personal liability arising from corporate activity both before and after the corporation became insolvent. The potential role these incentives can play in providing a basis for the trust needed to meet the other governance challenges that arise in a restructuring is reviewed in the context of recent developments in Canada concerning the duties of corporate directors to creditors during insolvency. Also reviewed is the role of directors' insurance and indemnification in altering the incentives' effects on directors' behavior. Finally a critical appraisal is given of the present legal regime's provision for compromise of claims against corporate officers during restructuring, as well as the proposal to amend the law to allow complete exoneration of corporate directors from certain liabilities on insolvency. The article urges caution in altering the effects of incentives that may create the necessary basis for trust in the distressed corporation's officers amongst those stakeholders whose co‐operation is crucial to restructuring. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. |
