Preemptive behavior in sequential-move tournaments with heterogeneous agents |
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Authors: | P-J Jost M Kräkel |
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Institution: | (1) Institute for Organization Theory, Otto-Beisheim-Hochschule, Burgplatz 2, 56179 Vallendar, Germany;(2) Department of Economics, BWL II, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24-42, 53113 Bonn, Germany |
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Abstract: | Rank-order tournaments are usually modeled simultaneously. However, real tournaments are often sequential. We show that agents'
strategic behavior in sequential-move tournaments significantly differ from the one in simultaneous-move tournaments: In a
sequential-move tournament with heterogeneous agents, the first acting agent may choose a preemptively high effort so that
the following agent gives up. The principal is able to prevent preemptive behavior in equilibrium by choosing a sufficiently
small spread between winner and loser prize.
Received: January 2003, Accepted: November 2004
JEL Classification:
J3, M12, M5
We would like to thank two anonymous referees and the editor Kai Konrad for helpful comments. Financial support by the Deutsche
Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG), projects no. KR 2077/2-1 and SFB/TR 15 ("Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems"),
is gratefully acknowledged. |
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Keywords: | Preemption tournaments |
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