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投资者保护执行与高管薪酬关系的研究
引用本文:王晓庆.投资者保护执行与高管薪酬关系的研究[J].山东纺织经济,2010(11):17-21.
作者姓名:王晓庆
作者单位:新疆财经大学,新疆乌鲁木齐,830012
摘    要:文章以我国2005-2008年度沪深两市所有上市公司为样本,考察了投资者保护执行对高管薪酬的影响。研究发现,在控制了其他因素的影响后,投资者保护执行对上市公司高级管理人员的薪酬具有显著的正向影响。研究结果表明,投资者保护执行制度没有对公司治理起到应有的促进作用。

关 键 词:投资者保护执行  高管薪酬

An Empirical Research on the Relationship between Investor Protection Execution and Executive Compensation
Wang Xiaoqing.An Empirical Research on the Relationship between Investor Protection Execution and Executive Compensation[J].Economy of Shangdong Textile,2010(11):17-21.
Authors:Wang Xiaoqing
Institution:Wang Xiaoqing (Xinjiang University of finance & Economics,Urumqi 830012,China)
Abstract:Using the data of listed-company from 2005 to 2008 in China,the paper studies the influence of investor protection execution on executive compensation.And,we found that investor protection execution has a significant positive effect on executive compensation of Chinese Public Companies.Empirical results indicate that the investor protection execution institution have not improved the corporate governance mechanism.
Keywords:investor protection execution  executive compensation  
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