Incentives and the structure of teams |
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Authors: | April Mitchell Franco Matthew Mitchell Galina Vereshchagina |
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Affiliation: | aRotman School of Management, University of Toronto, 105 St. George Street, Toronto, ON M5S3E6, Canada;bDepartment of Management, University of Toronto Scarborough, Canada;cDepartment of Economics, W.P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University, United States |
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Abstract: | This paper studies the relationship between moral hazard and the matching structure of teams. We show that team incentive problems may generate monotone matching predictions in the absence of complementarities in the production technology. Second, we analyze how complementarity in the underlying technology affects the matching predictions arising due to moral hazard. We find that (i) even when the production technology is strongly complementary, the incentive problem may lead to formation of negatively sorted teams; (ii) as the degree of complementarity increases, the optimal matching structure may switch from positive to negative, solely due to the need to provide incentives. |
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Keywords: | JEL classification: D21 D82 L23 |
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