新型货币政策担保品框架的绿色效应

本文以2018年6月我国央行开始接受绿色信贷资产作为MLF合格担保品这一事件为准自然实验,运用双重差分模型分析我国新型货币政策的担保品扩容对绿色信贷企业融资的影响。研究结果表明:第一,将绿色信贷资产纳入央行合格担保品范围增加了绿色信贷企业的信贷可得性,并降低了绿色信贷企业的信贷成本;第二,企业的异质性分析表明,民营绿色信贷企业在融资可得性方面对政策反应更显著,国有绿色信贷企业在融资成本方面对政策反应更显著;第三,分行业的扩展性检验表明,央行合格担保品扩容政策对于环保行业的绿色信贷企业主要通过提高融资可得性发挥作用,而对于重污染行业的绿色信贷企业则主要作用于其信贷融资成本。基于以上实证结果,本文认为央行担保品扩容具有绿色效应,可综合运用央行担保品框架和借贷便利类货币政策工具,加强我国新型货币政策的定向调控功能。

The Green Financing Effect of The Expanded Central Bank Collateral Framework

Since 2013, China's central bank has greatly enriched its monetary policy toolbox and innovatively launched several policy tools such as short-term liquidity operations (SLO), standing lending facility (SLF), medium-term lending facility (MLF) and targeted medium-term lending facility (TMLF). Through such monetary policy tools, the central bank provides different maturities to commercial banks by means of pledge. With the development of the new monetary policy, there are more and more discussions on various policy tools. However, as a part of the new monetary policy, the collateral framework of the central bank still lacks sufficient research. In June 2018, the People's Bank of China gave priority to accepting green bonds and green loans as collateral, reflecting the intention of China's monetary policy to channel more funds into the green sector. Whether the central bank's inclusion of green credit assets into the qualified collateral framework can further improve the financing level of green credit enterprises and reduce their financing cost requires further research.
Based on existing studies, we believe that the collateral framework of the central bank may act on both the balance sheet of commercial banks and the balance sheet of characteristic enterprises. On the one hand, the collateral policy of the central bank means that when the central bank issues base money through MLF, it requires commercial banks to provide qualified collateral such as green credit assets, so as to bypass the transmission from the liability end of commercial banks to the asset end. On the other hand, the central bank's inclusion of a certain type of credit and financial assets into the qualified collateral framework will improve the pledge right and scarcity of such assets (Nyborg, 2017), which is equivalent to the central bank's indirect “guarantee” for characteristic enterprises through national credit.
Specifically, this paper selects the quarterly financial data of A-share listed companies in the China Stock Market & Accounting Research (CSMAR)database from the first quarter of 2013 to the fourth quarter of 2019, and excludes financial companies and companies that have issued green bonds during this period. Using difference-in-differences (DID) method, we compare the different effects of the central bank's collateral expansion policy on the enterprises in the experimental group and the control group to identify a causal relationship. The main target of the collateral expansion policy is the enterprises that can obtain green credit, but there is no clear industry standard. Therefore, identifying the experimental group and the control group only by industries may underestimate the effect of the policy and ignore the impact of green credit on ordinary enterprises with energy conservation and environmental protection projects. Therefore, to more accurately determine the target subjects affected by the policy, we analyze the annual reports of listed companies through text analysis method, and manually classify companies with green projects into the experimental group and companies without green projects into the control groupbased on the description of green projects in the “Green Credit Statistical Statement” issued by China Banking Regulatory Commission in 2013.
This study finds that the expansion of qualified collateral by the central bank of China improves the financing availability of green credit enterprises, and extends their loan maturity structure, and the financing availability effect is more significant for private enterprises. In addition, the expansion of qualified collateral reduces the financing cost of green credit enterprises, and this effect mainly exists in state-owned enterprises. Moreover, the effects of the expansion policy are heterogenous across industries. In the green industry, the policy effect is mainly on the financing availability, while in the pollution industry, the policy effect is mainly on the financing cost. The above conclusions indicate that the central bank should further improve the system of eligible collateral framework, attach great importance to the collateral framework for bank financing constraints and credit preference regulation, and give full play to the eligible collateral in its directional support for the green resource allocation function of the financial system.
This paper mainly focuses on the green financial effect of the monetary policy—the expansion of the collateral framework—in China. Whether this new monetary policy can be transmitted to the green production level needs further analysis. The relationship between the new monetary policy and green development still needs to be explored.