| 政府投资项目代建服务取费机制研究——一个风险分担的视角 |
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| 引用本文： | 严敏,尹贻林.政府投资项目代建服务取费机制研究——一个风险分担的视角[J].财经问题研究,2010(3). |
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| 作者姓名： | 严敏 尹贻林 |
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| 作者单位： | 天津大学管理学院,天津,300072;天津大学管理学院,天津,300072;天津理工大学管理学院,天津,300384 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金项目(70872084) |
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| 摘 要： | 本文通过在代建服务取费基本模型中引入政府投资人与代建人之间的风险分担因素,对模型中激励费用部分的激励费率和相应的取费基数进行了分析,并就不同风险分担组合条件下的代建服务取费模型进行了描述。研究结果表明,代建服务取费模型中的激励费率和相应的取费基数都与风险分担有着直接或间接的关系,而风险分担取决于双方的风险态度,从客观上要求政府委托人对代建人的风险态度做出准确的判断。该结论将为构建合理的代建服务取费机制提供参考依据。
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| 关 键 词： | 政府投资项目 代建服务取费机制 风险分担 项目剩余 |
Research on Agent Construction Service Pricing Mechanism of Government Investment Projects:A Perspective of Risk Allocation |
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| YAN Min,YIN Yi-lin.Research on Agent Construction Service Pricing Mechanism of Government Investment Projects:A Perspective of Risk Allocation[J].Research On Financial and Economic Issues,2010(3). |
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| Authors: | YAN Min YIN Yi-lin |
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| Institution: | 1.School of Management;Tianjin University;Tianjin 300072;China;2.Management School;Tianjin University of Technology;Tianjin 300384;China |
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| Abstract: | The implementation of Agent Construction System(ACS) is aiming at resolving the problems arising from traditional management mode.However,ACS has encountered some problems,and the agent construction service pricing mechanism is one of the most important problems.By introducing risk allocation of the government principal and the construction agency into the primary pricing model,the article analysis the incentive ratio and relative benchmark in the model.Moreover,it has described the agent construction servi... |
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| Keywords: | government investment projects agent construction service pricing mechanism risk allocation project residual |
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