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基于联盟成员风险偏好组合的技术外包激励机制研究
引用本文:晏鹰,宋妍. 基于联盟成员风险偏好组合的技术外包激励机制研究[J]. 技术经济, 2009, 28(5): 21-25
作者姓名:晏鹰  宋妍
作者单位:南京理工大学,经济管理学院,南京,210094;南京理工大学,经济管理学院,南京,210094
摘    要:本文假定在技术外包过程中联盟成员具有风险中性、风险规避等不同的风险偏好,在此基础上区分了技术外包方与技术提供方的4类风险偏好组合,建立了委托-代理模型,考察了联盟成员的不同风险态度对技术提供方的提成比例、努力水平及技术外包方收益结果的影响,并给出了在联盟成员不同风险偏好组合下的最优激励合同。

关 键 词:技术外包  风险偏好  激励机制

Study on Incentive Mechanism of Technology Outsourcing Based on Combination of Risk Preference Of Members
Yan Ying,Song Yan. Study on Incentive Mechanism of Technology Outsourcing Based on Combination of Risk Preference Of Members[J]. Technology Economics, 2009, 28(5): 21-25
Authors:Yan Ying  Song Yan
Affiliation:School of Economics and Management;Nanjing University of Science & Technology;Nanjing 210094;China
Abstract:Supposing risk preferences of technology alliance members are risk neutral or risk adverse,this paper differentiates four states of combination of risk attitudes between technology outsourcing buyer and supplier,and establishes an principal-agent model.Then,it examines the impacts of different members' risk attitudes on the supplier's ratio of interest,the effort degree and the buyer's income.Finally,it gives the optimal incentive contract under different combination of members' risk attitudes.
Keywords:technology outsourcing  risk preference  incentive mechanism  
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