| 经理股票期权激励制度的理论基础 |
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| 引用本文： | 张春红,田林.经理股票期权激励制度的理论基础[J].商业经济(哈尔滨),2009(8). |
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| 作者姓名： | 张春红 田林 |
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| 作者单位： | 郑州大学,西亚斯国际学院,河南,新郑,451150
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| 摘 要： | 经理股票期权激励制度是激励机制的一种创新,通过授予股票期权使经营者的目标同股东的目标保持一致.在追求个人利益最大化的同时实现了股东利益的最大化.经理股票期权作为一种制度安排,背后有着深刻的理论依据,如委托代理理论、人力资本理论、激励理论和X(低)效率理论.
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| 关 键 词： | 经理股票期权 委托代理理论 人力资本理论 激励理论 X(低)效率理论 |
Theoretical Foundation of Incentive System on Executive Stock Option |
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| ZHANG Chun-hong,TIAN Lin.Theoretical Foundation of Incentive System on Executive Stock Option[J].Business Economy,2009(8). |
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| Authors: | ZHANG Chun-hong TIAN Lin |
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| Abstract: | The incentive system on executive stock option is a creative incentive mechanism,which keeps operators and shareholders with the same aim through offering stock option,and realizes the maximization of shareholders' interests as well as personal interests.As a system,executive stock option bases on profound theories,such as principal-agent theory,human capital theory,incentive theory,and X(low) efficiency theory. |
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