金融监管制度与机会主义行为机理研究

由于金融市场的信息不对称和外部性难以根本消除,致使机会主义行为难以避免。金融监管制度的演变即是保障存款人利益、预防和化解金融风险维护金融系统稳定的过程,也是对金融机构和监管机构及相关代理人机会主义行为规避和治理的过程。本文以委托代理模型为起点,分析金融机构经营信息已知和未知两种状态下监管机构和金融机构各自的效用函数,通过引入监管制度和代理人风险偏好变量分析其对机会主义行为的影响。研究发现：信息状态转变会引起监管契约从强制型契约向合作关系型契约转变,机会主义表现形式也随之变化;不对称信息下绩效挂钩的监管收入激励模式会同时增加监管者和金融机构代理人的机会主义倾向;信息结构变化要求监管制度也应发生变化才能适应监管有效性要求。

A Study on Institution of Financial Regulation and Mechanism of Opportunistic Behaviors

This paper argues that asymmetric information and externality are difficult to eliminate in financial market,thus opportunistic behaviors are inevitable.It analyzes the utility function of financial companies and regulators with modified principal-supervisor-agent model.We find that information status change leads the supervisory contract transferring from compulsory to cooperative with changed form of opportunism,and that the regulators’ and financial agent’s opportunistic behaviors are enhanced with asymmetric information status and the connection of regulators’ revenue with financial performance.The regulatory institutions should be changed according to the information structure,so as to adjust to the requirement of regulatory efficiency.