机制设计理论综述

机制的新理解和激励相容概念使得机制设计框架得以确立,显示原理极大简化了分析框架。公共品经济难以有效权衡配置效率、自愿参与和激励相容。公共品提供的占优策略均衡机制,在拟线性环境和一般性经济环境下分别导致帕累托严格无效和独裁。在贝叶斯环境下,对于公共品经济和私人品经济,帕累托效率与自愿参与均难以兼容。其中,公共品不兼容性在极限角度仍成立。纳什执行及其拓展试图使在所设机制下的所有均衡结果对于社会选择目标而言都最优。放松关于信息结构和理性的假定,理论的最新发展围绕信息结构内生化、机制稳健化以及计算机制设计问题展开。

A Review of Mechanism Design Theories

The new understanding of the mechanism and the concept of incentive compatibility make the mechanism design framework established,the display principle greatly simplifies the analytical framework.The public goods economy is difficult to effectively balance the allocation efficiency,voluntary participation and incentive compatibility.The dominant strategy equilibrium mechanism provided by the public goods can lead to strict Pareto ineffective and authoritarian respectively in the quasi-linear environment and the general economic environment.In Bayesian environment,for both public goods economy and private goods economy,Pareto efficiency and voluntary participation are hardly compatible.Among them,the incompatibility of public goods still holds at the limit angle.The Nash implementation and its expansion try to make all the balanced results in the given mechanisms the optimum for the objectives of social choices.To relax the assumption about the information structure and reason,the latest developments of the theories are unfolded around the endogeny of the information structure,a stable mechanism,and the issues of computing mechanism design.