强制披露、盈余质量与市场化进程——基于制度互补性的分析

文章以2005-2009年沪深两市953家上市公司共4 765个样本为研究对象,控制了内生性后发现:由于法律制度尚不完善、积累的监管经验有限,控股股东往往倾向于让强制披露显得更加完整,以便赢取良好的市场声誉,从而加剧了控股股东掏空上市公司的隧道行为。为了隐瞒这种行为,盈余往往会被操纵。但是在市场化程度较高的地区,完善的法律保护与监管体系为强制披露的质量提供了制度保障,因此在这类地区强制披露与盈余质量显著正相关。

Compulsory Disclosure,Earnings Quality and the Process of Marketization:An Analysis Based on Institutional Complementarity

On the basis of 953 listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2005 to 2009 and controlling the endogeny,this paper finds that,owing to imperfect legal systems and limited supervision experience,controlling shareholders are usually apt to make compulsory disclosure more complete in order to gain a good market reputation,thus exacerbating the tunneling behavior of controlling shareholders.For the purpose of concealing these behaviors,controlling shareholders always manipulate the earnings.H...