审计质量、终极控股股东与盈余管理

文章以2005—2009年沪深两市A股上市公司为研究样本,研究终极控股股东特征与盈余管理的关系,同时考虑了盈余管理的制约因素,进一步研究了审计质量差异对终极控股股东特征与盈余管理关系的影响。研究结果表明,终极控股股东对盈余管理的影响并没有随着控制权比例的增加由"壕沟效应"转向"协同效应";当终极控股股东为非国有身份时,上市公司盈余管理程度更高;两权分离程度以及金字塔控制层级与上市公司盈余管理程度显著正相关;较高的审计质量有助于识别和降低公司盈余管理程度,并能够抑制终极控股股东两权分离程度对盈余管理的影响。

Audit Quality,the Ultimate Controlling Shareholder and Earnings Management

On the basic of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies empirical data from 2006 to 2010,this paper investigates the relationship between the characteristics of the ultimate controlling shareholder and earnings management,taking into account the constraints of earnings management,and further studies the audit quality differences of the ultimate controlling shareholder characteristics earnings management.The results show that the impact of the ultimate controlling shareholder on earnings management never changed with the increase of the proportion of control;when the ultimate controlling shareholder with non-state identity,earnings management more;significantly positively related to the degree of separation of ownership and the pyramid level of control of listed companies extent of earnings management;higher audit quality is helpful to identify and reduce the extent of earnings management,and the influence of the earning management on the increased of the degree of the seperation of the ultimate controlling shareholder.