| 景区经营权转让下旅游资源开发激励约束契约设计 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 郭淳凡.景区经营权转让下旅游资源开发激励约束契约设计[J].经济地理,2010,30(6). |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 郭淳凡 |
| |
| 作者单位： | 暨南大学管理学院旅游管理系; |
| |
| 基金项目： | 教育部人文社会科学研究项目 |
| |
| 摘 要： | 转让景区经营权是目前我国旅游资源开发的主要模式之一。运用委托代理理论,对企业在旅游资源开发中的道德风险问题进行分析,将保护性开发下所获得的旅游收入与地方政府支付给企业的资源补偿相联系,建立景区经营权转让下的旅游资源开发激励契约模型,并提出完善旅游资源开发激励机制的建议。
|
| 关 键 词： | 委托代理 旅游资源开发 激励约束 道德风险 |
DESIGNING OF THE INCENTIVE AND RESTRICTIVE CONTRACT FOR DEVELOPING TOURISM RESOURCES UNDER THE OPERATIONAL RIGHT TRANSFERRING |
| |
| GUO Chun-fan.DESIGNING OF THE INCENTIVE AND RESTRICTIVE CONTRACT FOR DEVELOPING TOURISM RESOURCES UNDER THE OPERATIONAL RIGHT TRANSFERRING[J].Economic Geography,2010,30(6). |
| |
| Authors: | GUO Chun-fan |
| |
| Institution: | GUO Chun-fan(The School of Management,Jinan University,Guangzhou 510632,Guangdong,China) |
| |
| Abstract: | The operation right transferring is one of the main modes of developing tourism resources(DTR) in China.Under this mode,the relationship between local governments and investing companies is principal-agent.Based on the principal-agent theory,this paper analyzes the moral hazard of developing tourism resources.It links tourism revenues to the developing compensation,designing a incentive and restrictive contract.Then,based on the model,the problems in DTR are analyzed,and put forward suggestions for improvin... |
| |
| Keywords: | principal-agent developing tourism resource the incentive and restrictive contract moral hazard |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
|
