Network design in games with spillovers |
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Authors: | Sergio Currarini |
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Institution: | (1) Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Università Ca’ Foscari di Venezia, S. Giobbe 873, 30121 Venezia, Italy;(2) School for Advanced Studies in Venice, Venezia, Italy |
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Abstract: | How should an organization be designed in order to provide its members with minimal incentives to defect? And how does the optimal design depend on the type of strategic interaction between defectors and remaining organizational members? This paper addresses such issues in a game theoretic model of cooperation, in which an organization is formally represented by a connected network, and where gains from cooperation are given by a partition function. We show that critical structural features of the organization depend in a clear-cut way on the sign of spillovers. In particular, positive spillovers favor the adoption of dispersed and centralized forms, while negative spillovers favor cohesive and horizontal ones. Moreover, if the organizational form determines all the communication possibilities of members, a highly centralized organization—the star—emerges under positive spillovers, whereas two horizontal architectures—the circle and the complete—emerge under negative spillovers. |
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Keywords: | Organizational design Networks Group stability Spillovers |
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