Financial networks,bank efficiency and risk-taking |
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Affiliation: | 1. Department of Finance and Accounting, Surrey Business School, University of Surrey, Guildford, Surrey GU2 7XH, UK;2. Lancaster University Management School, Lancaster LA1 4YX, UK;1. Economics and Finance Group, Portsmouth Business School, University of Portsmouth, Portsmouth, PO1 3DE, UK;2. Department of Economics, State University of New York, Binghamton, NY 13902-6000, USA;3. University of Stavanger Business School, Stavanger, Norway |
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Abstract: | ![]() Networks with a core–periphery topology are found in many financial systems across different jurisdictions. Though the theoretical and structural aspects of core–periphery networks are clear, the consequences that core–periphery structures bring for banking efficiency stand as an open question. We address this gap in the literature by providing insights as to how the structure of financial networks can affect bank efficiency. We find that core–periphery structures are cost efficient for banks, which is a characteristic that encourages the participation of banks in financial networks. On the downside, we also show that core–periphery structures are risk-taking inefficient, because they imply higher systemic risk levels in the financial system. In this way, regulators should be aware of the excessive risk inefficiency that arises in the financial system due to individual decisions made by banks in the network. |
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Keywords: | Efficiency Financial network Core–periphery Interconnectivity Risk |
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