首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     检索      

利润操纵、股权再融资与资本配置效率研究
引用本文:徐磊,张祥建.利润操纵、股权再融资与资本配置效率研究[J].上海管理科学,2007,29(2):15-19.
作者姓名:徐磊  张祥建
作者单位:1. 上海交通大学经济与管理学院
2. 上海财经大学财经研究所
摘    要:本文研究了资本市场参与者的行为与利润操纵之间的关系,并分析了对资本配置效率的影响效应。大股东通过操纵报告盈余来改变会计盈余的时间分布和误导投资者,从而攫取更多的隐性收益,造成资本市场配置效率的降低。研究结果表明:(1)大股东通过利润操纵在股权再融资过程中可以获得中小股东无法得到的隐性收益;(2)大股东的收益随着利润操纵程度的增加而提升,中小股东的财富随着利润操纵程度的增加而降低;(3)利润操纵程度的增加将降低上市公司的资本配置效率和企业价值。

关 键 词:大股东控制  股权再融资  利润操纵  寻租行为

The Study of Earnings Management, Equity Refinancing and Efficiency of Resource Allocation
Xu Lei,Zhang Xiangjian.The Study of Earnings Management, Equity Refinancing and Efficiency of Resource Allocation[J].Shanghai Managent Science,2007,29(2):15-19.
Authors:Xu Lei  Zhang Xiangjian
Institution:Xu Lei Zhang Xiangjian
Abstract:This paper mainly analyzes the relationship between market participants and earnings manipulation,and examines earnings manipulation and its effect on efficiency of capital allocation,Large shareholders can change the assess- ment of the listed companies' profit ability and investment values through manipulating the time distribution of earn- ings,and raise the price of equity and snatch more private benefits.The results suggest that large shareholders can ob- tain private benefits at the cost of small shareholders through earnings manipulation in the course of equity refinancing, and that the benefits of large shareholders increases with the rising of the degree of earnings manipulation,while the ben- efits of small shareholders decrease with the rising of the de- gree of earnings manipulation.The results also show that the efficiency of capital allocation and corporate value will decrease with the rising of the degree of earnings manipula- tion.
Keywords:control of large shareholders  seasoned equity offerings  earnings management  Rent Seeking Behavior
本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号