| 碳排放权交易下的异质性企业博弈模型分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 王一涵,赵令锐.碳排放权交易下的异质性企业博弈模型分析[J].工业技术经济,1900,1(8):0-0. |
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| 作者姓名： | 王一涵 赵令锐 |
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| 作者单位： | １中国社会科学院研究生院
２吉林工商学院 |
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| 摘 要： | 本文基于碳排放权交易机制，建立理性层次不同、非线性成本的进行碳排放权交易的两企业垄断产量博弈模型，然后对模型系统的进行稳定性分析和数值模拟。分析发现，系统的稳定性与系统的所有参数都相关，而碳排放权交易价格的变化对系统均衡点的存在性、稳定性及其值的大小也有很大的影响。模拟结果表明，系统的稳定性取决于有限理性企业的产量调整速度和适应性理性企业的产量调整速度，碳排放权交易价格的升高会导致系统的稳定性增加，而随着碳排放权交易价格的升高，企业的均衡产量因碳交易成本的增加而减少。
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| 关 键 词： | 有限理性 适应性理性 Nash均衡 |
Analysis of the Game Model with
Heterogeneous Playersunder Carbon Emission Trading |
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| Wang Yihan,Zhao Lingrui.Analysis of the Game Model with
Heterogeneous Playersunder Carbon Emission Trading[J].Industrial Technology & Economy,1900,1(8):0-0. |
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| Authors: | Wang Yihan Zhao Lingrui |
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| Institution: | １．Graduate School of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
２．JiLin Business and Technology College |
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| Abstract: | Base
d on the mechanism of carbon emission trading,a quantity game model with heterog
eneous players and nonlinear cost function was established.Through stability ana
lysis and numerical simulation,the model was discussed.The analysis found that t
he stability of system was concerned with all its parameters,and the price of ca
rbon emission trading played an important role in the existence and stability of
equilibrium points and their values.The simulations showed that the stability o
f system depended on the speed of quantity adjustment of bounded rational player
and the speed of quantity adjustment of adaptive rational player.In addition,th
e rise of the price of carbon emission trading would result in the increasing of
systems stability,and with the rise of the price of carbon emission,the equil
ibrium quantities of players would be reduced because of their higher cost. |
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