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国有企业退出中政府与内部利益相关者的博弈
引用本文:周青. 国有企业退出中政府与内部利益相关者的博弈[J]. 改革, 2004, 0(5): 101-104
作者姓名:周青
作者单位:重庆市人民政府办公厅,重庆,400015
摘    要:
用博弈论的方法分析在国有企业退出时政府和相关利益者所采取的策略,可以发现,只有在政府与国有企业相关利益者都能双赢时,才能保证国有企业顺利退出。

关 键 词:国有企业  相关利益者  退出  博弈

An Analysis on the Game of Government and Relative Internal Interest Person in the Fade of State-owned Enterprises
Zhou Qing. An Analysis on the Game of Government and Relative Internal Interest Person in the Fade of State-owned Enterprises[J]. Reform, 2004, 0(5): 101-104
Authors:Zhou Qing
Abstract:
The game theory is adapted in this article to analyze the strategy of government and relative interest person when state-owned enterprises fade. And the author thought that only when government and the relative state-owned enterprises both benefit, can the state-owned enterprises fade successfully.
Keywords:game  state-owned enterprises  relative interest person  fade
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