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垄断厂商产量决策的TU博弈分析
引用本文:刘冬萍,江永红. 垄断厂商产量决策的TU博弈分析[J]. 全球科技经济瞭望, 2008, 23(3): 33-38. DOI: 10.3772/j.issn.1009-8623.2008.03.006
作者姓名:刘冬萍  江永红
作者单位:安徽大学经济学院,合肥,230039
摘    要:传统经济学在对垄断分析中,总是将垄断厂商的低供给水平,看作是衡量垄断的指标,即垄断厂商通过低供给来实现垄断.没有低供给这条假设,似乎就不能找到判定垄断是否存在的标准了.本文通过对垄断厂商与购买者的议价博弈进行分析,建立了一个产出可以由一系列议价结果所表示的模型.并指出如果将垄断厂商的议价信心指数(α)纳入到产量选择上,垄断厂商的决策将有很大改变.最后,本文得出,低供给只是解释垄断的部分原因.

关 键 词:可转移效用博弈  垄断厂商  产量选择

A TU Game Analysis of Molopolists'Capacity Choice
Liu Dongping,Jiang Yonghong. A TU Game Analysis of Molopolists'Capacity Choice[J]. , 2008, 23(3): 33-38. DOI: 10.3772/j.issn.1009-8623.2008.03.006
Authors:Liu Dongping  Jiang Yonghong
Affiliation:Liu Dongping Jiang Yonghong (Economics School of Anhui University,Hefei 230039)
Abstract:In the classical analysis of monopoly,we always assumes that the seller will choose a under- supply to create monopoly.Without this assumption,it is not clear whether monopoly exists.To address this question,this paper uses the core of a TU game between the seller and the buyer.We also provide a model of competition in which outcomes can be interpreted as the consequences of free-form bargaining or negotiations. This paper shows that undersuply determines monopoly only partially.And the monopolist's view of...
Keywords:TU game   monopolist   capacity choice
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