专利反向支付协议反垄断规制探论:美国的经验及启示

在美国医药行业，一种由专利侵权诉讼的原告反方向对被告巨额支付以换取被告延迟或放弃进入市场的和解协议引发了广泛关注，此种被称为反向支付协议的特殊协议是专利链接制度的副产品。有别于第十一巡回法院对该协议适用专利范围测试和第六巡回法院适用本身违法原则的做法，美国最高法院选择适用经典合理原则展开分析，寄望通过对诸多因素的兼权熟计，降低错误成本。实际上，合理原则的局限性使得执两用中的推定违法原则成为解开反垄断规制之惑的最佳选择。作为知识产权强国和仿制药生产及消费大国，中国也具备滋生反向支付协议的制度和产业环境。中国制度语境下，应将该协议置于“禁止＋豁免”分析框架下，实现维护竞争秩序、激励创新等多元价值权衡。

Antitrust Regulation toward Patent Reverse Payment Settlement:Experience in the United States and Its Implications

In the pharmaceutical industry of the United States, the patent litigation settlement agreement which includes reverse payments from the patent holder to the alleged infringer, has aroused widespread concern. The typical purpose of this agreement is as exchange for the alleged infringer's agreement to delay or abandon market entry. The agreement is the by-product of the patent linkage system. The Supreme Court analyzed this agreement under the traditional rule of reason and hoped to reduce the cost of mistake by comprehensively evaluating various factors. However, due to the limitations of the rule of reason, the presumptive illegality approach would presumably become the most appropriate rule in the United States. In China's context, the reverse-payment agreement should be analyzed under the prohibition and exemption framework, in order to achieve the balance of competition order maintenance, innovation incentives and other values.