Playing safe in coordination games:: the roles of risk dominance, payoff dominance, and history of play |
| |
| Authors: | David Schmidt Robert Shupp James M Walker Elinor Ostrom |
| |
| Institution: | a Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission, 601 Pennsylvania Ave. NW, Washington, DC 20580, USA;b Department of Economics, Ball State University, Muncie, IN 47306, USA;c Department of Economics & Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405, USA;d Department of Political Science & Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405, USA |
| |
| Abstract: | This paper presents results from a series of experiments designed to test the impact on subject behavior of changes in the risk dominance and payoff dominance characteristics of two player coordination games. The main finding is that changes in risk dominance significantly affect play of the subjects, whereas changes in the level of payoff dominance do not. Observed history of play also has an important influence on subject behavior, both when subjects are randomly rematched after each game and when they remain matched with the same individual for a sequence of games. |
| |
| Keywords: | Experimental economics Game theory Equilibrium selection Risk dominance Payoff dominance |
| 本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录！ |
|
