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基于零售商促销努力的混合契约设计
引用本文:邓云,卢光松.基于零售商促销努力的混合契约设计[J].价值工程,2008,27(6):12-14.
作者姓名:邓云  卢光松
作者单位:合肥工业大学,管理学院,合肥,230009
基金项目:安徽教育厅人文社科项目
摘    要:在供应链协作中,供应商与零售商之间的合作尤为重要。零售商的促销水平极大的影响了产品的需求与销量,但促销活动同时也为零售商带来了额外的经营成本,经营成本的增加将导致零售商缺乏足够的积极性加大对促销活动的投入,因此需要供应商分担部分经营成本。利用回购契约与销量返利组合契约,分析了在允许二次进货的情况下供应商和零售商之间的利益关系,并设计了一种混合契约,以激励零售商为获得更多利润而加大促销努力的投入。

关 键 词:供应链协调  线性转移支付  Stackelberg博弈  零售商促销努力

Hybrid Contract Design Based on Retailer Promotional Effort
Deng Yun,Lu Guangsong.Hybrid Contract Design Based on Retailer Promotional Effort[J].Value Engineering,2008,27(6):12-14.
Authors:Deng Yun  Lu Guangsong
Abstract:In supply chain coordination,the cooperation between the supplier and the retailer is very important. The retailer’s promotional effort level extremely affects the demand and the sale,and the sale promotion activities are costly. Due to the increased operating cost,the retailer may not have enough enthusiasm to enlarge investment for those activities,so it requires that supplier should share the cost of effort. In this paper a contract composed of bay back contract and sale rebate contract is given,and the benefit relation between the supplier and the retailer is analyzed in the case of restock. Then a hybrid contract is designed to stimulate the retailer to enlarge investment in sale promotion activities in order to gain more profit.
Keywords:supply chain coordination  linear transfer payment  Stackelberg game  retailer promotional effort
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