私募基金合伙人契约研究*

本文借助委托代理理论框架研究私募基金的合伙人契约。有限合伙制下普通合伙人（代理人）拥有人力资本，而有限合伙人（委托人）拥有货币资本。人力资本相对稀缺，使得普通合伙人在博弈中处于相对有利地位，并获得设计合伙人契约的权利，从而博弈流程与公司制具有质的不同。本文首先给出与公司制下米里斯霍姆斯特姆罗杰森条件相对应的有限合伙制下的最优契约决定条件，将两种机制进行比较，从理论上解释私募基金的运营实践。有限合伙制下的激励程度更高，普通合伙人有动力实现更好的业绩。本文最后讨论线性契约并进行相应的函数模拟。

RESEARCH ON THE PARTNERS' CONTRACT IN PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS

This paper mainly studies on the partners contract in private equity funds based on the principal agent theory. Human capital belonging to the general partner (the agent) is relatively scarce over money capital belonging to the limited partner (the principal), which entitles the general partner to the power in designing partners contracts. Hence, the game structure is different with the one in traditional corporations.This research first shows the optimal contract conditions in the limited partnership funds corresponding to Mirrlees Holmstrom Rogersonconditions in company funds, makes comparisons between them, and then theoretically explains the practice. The limited partnershipmechanism has advantage of incentive, and encourages the general partner to work harder to achieve higher earnings of funds. Later, this paper discusses the linear contract case and makes functional simulation.