风险企业的道德风险与控制权配置的模型分析

风险企业的控制权配制是在满足风险企业家激励相容和风险投资家参与约束条件下的一种相机性配置机制,它有别于 传统理论要求的"剩余索取权必须与控制权相匹配"的配置原则,能使双方在签约后根据企业绩效(或企业风险)的变动,进行相 应的权利调整,因而尽可能地解决了风险企业中的风险分担和激励问题。

A Model Analysis of Moral Hazard and the Allocation of Control Rights in the Venture Capital Backed Companies

Under the framework of the model of entrepreneur subject to moral hazard, the paper explores the equilibrium point of the control rights owned by the entrepreneur when his inventive compatibility constraints and the venture capitalist's participation constraints are satisfied. Based on the above analysis, the paper analyzes the influence of the entrepreneurs residual claimancy. human capital value, and private benefits from running the firm and effort on the control rights owned by the entrepreneur. The result shows that the allocation of control rights in the VC -backed companies is the kind of contingent allocation mechanism, which is different from the viewpoints of traditional firm theory, and as a result restrains the entrepreneur's moral hazard behaviors.