Applying economic methodology to the war on terrorism |
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Authors: | Muhammad Q Islam Wassim N Shahin |
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Institution: | (1) Saint Louis University, Saint Louis, USA;(2) Lebanese American University, Lebanon |
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Abstract: | The application of economic methodology to the problem of terrorism is discussed. Theoretical and empirical results are discussed
with particular focus on the September 11 attack and the retaliatory response by the United States. Economists have relied
on the rational agent model to derive testable hypotheses regarding the behavior of terrorists. The rational agent model postulates
that terrorists respond to incentives, including media publicity, and the model predicts that when the net marginal benefit
from one type of terrorist activity is diminished, terrorists will substitute into alternative modes of terrorism. Empirical
results demonstrating that such substitutions indeed occur are discussed. Therefore, policy designed to reduce a particular
form of terrorism, such as increased airport security to prevent airplane hijackings, may simply result in terrorists choosing
alternative modes of terrorism. Empirical evidence demonstrating that terrorism is cyclical in nature is also discussed. Evidence
on substitution and cycles suggests that following temporary reduction in terrorist activity after retaliation against terrorists
and their infrastructure, terrorists are able to successfully regroup and attack using alternative means. Therefore, the current
US focus on fighting terrorism on all fronts and over the long haul is the correct approach. |
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