后金融危机时代我国银行监管的博弈分析

2008年以来的全球金融危机暴露了美国等发达国家在金融监管上的不足，加强金融监管已成为国际社会的共识。在世界各国强有力的干预刺激下，全球经济开始缓慢复苏，新形势下加强银行监管势在必行。在我国，银行业在金融业中一直占主导地位，对商业银行进行合规性监管仍将是现实情况下我国银行监管的重要内容。本文针对我国银行监管现存的问题，建立监管的博弈模型，得出混合战略纳什均衡，并从完善监管的法律体系、规范商业银行信息披露制度、建立监管者的激励约束机制、加强监管的国内国际协调、完善国内银行资本监管制度等方面对我国现行银行监管制度提出了相应的政策建议。

Analysis on Chinese Banking Supervision Through Game Theory After the Financial Crisis

After the financial crisis from 2008, people realize that we should enforce financial supervision since it revealed the defects on financial supervision of United States and other developed countries. Under strong stimulation and interference in the world, the global economy began to slowly recovery and in the new situation, it is imperative to strengthen banking supervision..Banking is the most important component of finance in our country. The main task of Chinese banking supervision is to implement compliance supervision over commercial banks. This essay focuses on the problems existing in banking supervision system of our country and builds up supervision model through game theory. Appropriate policies and measurements on supervision legal systems, systems of information disclosure in commercial banks, incentive and constraint mechanism for supervisors domestic and international supervision coordination, supervision of banking capital should be implemented.